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Comments
APPOINTMENT OF AN EQUITABLE RECEIVER
T t -,TNTTTQVT T A:AN UNUSUAL REMEDY
FOR AN EXTRAORDINARY SITUATION
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of the ancient and equitable remedy of receivership to
take property from the hands of the parties and place it in the
hands of the court until a controversy has been decided or a pur-
pose carried out, is a subject that has not been extensively dis-
cussed in Pennsylvania.1 Because material pertaining to receiver-
ship is to be found, in part, in a variety of sources, it is difficult to
pin-point what circumstances the Pennsylvania courts require for
the appointment of an equitable receiver. This comment presents
a review of the factors that have been considered in cases in which
a receivership has been requested, and attempts to develop a
framework of inquiry as an aid in predicting whether a receiver-
ship may be approved in a given situation.
II. THE NATURE OF RECEIVERSHIP-BASICS
A. Definitional Framework
A receiver is an "indifferent person between the parties to
1. Pennsylvania decisions are discussed generally, along with the de-
cisions of other jurisdictions, in R. Clark, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND
PRACTICE oF RECEIVERS (3d ed. 1959) [hereinafter cited as Clark]; a discus-
sion of the remedy in the federal courts may be found in Comment, Equi-
table Remedy of Receivership-State Law in the Federal Courts, 10 STAN.
L. REV. 361 (1958); one of the few discussions on the Pennsylvania law
may be found in McDougall v. Huntington & Broad Top R. & C. Co., 294
Pa. 108, 143 A. 574 (1928).
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the cause, appointed by the court to receive and preserve the
property or fund in litigation . . . when it does not seem reason-
able that either party should hold it."12 In his treatise on receiv-
ers, Clark3 points out that the term "equitable, equity or chancery
receiver" generally refers to a receiver pendente Jite, 4 that is, ap-
pointed before or during the litigation, but he notes that the term
equitable receiver may also refer to a receiver appointed after-
judgment, where a receiver is appointed to preserve the property
pending an appeal or in aid of execution.5 A permanent receiver is
generally one appointed for the full term of the litigation;6 a tem-
porary receiver is a
[m]ere custodian of the property [who is] . . . often ap-
pointed upon the filing of the bill, under the general
equity power of the court, in order to preserve the assets
from waste until the hearing can be had which will deter-
mine whether the defendant's assets are in such a position
as to require being placed under a receiver.'
Rule 1533 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure distin-
guishes a temporary and a permanent receiver by providing that a
temporary receiver may be appointed without notice. The appoint-
ment of a permanent receiver, however, requires a hearing,s the
appointment of two appraisers to evaluate the property involved, 9
2. J. High, HIGH ON RECEIVERS 2 (4th ed. 1910).
3. See note 1 supra.
4. 1 Clark 16.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. National General Credit Corp. v. Worth & Co., 274 Pa. 148, 150,
117 A. 914, 915 (1922).
8. PA. R. Cv. P. 1533 (a) (1967):
A temporary receiver may be appointed without notice if re-
quired by the exigencies of the case. Except as otherwise provided
by an Act of Assembly, such appointment may not be made unless
(1) the plaintiff files a bond in an amount fixed and with
security approved by the court, naming the Commonwealth as
obligee, conditioned that if the appointment is vacated because
improperly made the plaintiff shall pay to any person injured
all damages sustained by reason of such appointment and all
legally taxable costs and fees, or
(2) the plaintiff deposits with the prothonotary legal tender
of the United States in an amount fixed by the court to be held
by the prothonotary upon the same condition as provided for
the bond.
A hearing on the continuation or revocation of the appoint-
ment shall be held promptly. Notice of the hearing shall be given
by the temporary receiver to all persons interested, including cred-
itors and stockholders, if any, whose addresses are known or can
be ascertained.
9. PA. R. Civ. P. 1533 (f) (1967):
Except as otherwise provided by an Act of Assembly, the
court upon appointing a permanent receiver shall also appoint two
appraisers who shall promptly inventory and appraise all assets
and that a time be fixed within which the receiver appointed shall
file a report.10 The distinction made by this rule is well summar-
ized by Clark's definition of a temporary receiver as one who may
be appointed at the institution of a suit for the appointment of
a permanent receiver."
A receiver is often called the "officer of the court" 12 or the
"executive hand of a court of equity.' 1 3 Thus, "his acts with re-
gard to the property in his custody, when authorized, are the acts
of the courts in whose hands, in contemplation of law, the prop-
erty actually is."'14 The receiver collects and administers assets
"not in his own right, or for his own benefit ...," his duty being
"to protect ... for the benefit of the persons ultimately entitled to
it, an estate over which the court has found it necessary to ex-
tend its' care."'
The receiver is subject to the discretion and control of the
court,17 and he has no powers other than "those conferred upon
him by the order of his appointment, or such as are derived from
the established practice of courts of equity."' 8 When a receiver is
in doubt about his duties, he may apply to the court for specific
instructions, and even the matter of his compensation is regulated
by the appointing authority. 19
Being an equitable remedy, the question of appointment, when
raised, is not decided by a jury, but is a matter for the discretion
of the court; 20 the court's exercise of discretion will not be ques-
of the defendant. The compensation of the appraisers shall be de-
termined by the court.
10. PA. R. Civ. P. 1533(g) (1967):
Every decree appointing a permanent receiver shall fix the
time within which the receiver shall file a report setting forth the
property of the debtor, the interests in and claims against it, its
income-producing capacity and recommendations as to the best
method of realizing its value for the benefit of those entitled.
11. 1 Clark 21.
12. Schwartz v. Keystone Oil Co., 153 Pa. 283, 286, 25 A. 1018 (1893).
See also Warner v. Conn., 347 Pa. 617, 620, 32 A.2d 740, 741 (1943); Penn-
sylvania Turnpike Comm'n v. Evans, 13 Pa. D. & C.2d 290, 299 (Dauph.
1957), aff'd, 392 Pa. 110, 139 A.2d 530 (1958).
13. Schwartz v. Keystone Oil Co., 153 Pa. at 286, 25 A. at 1018-19.
See also McDougall v. Huntingdon & Broad Top R. & C. Co., 294 Pa. 108,
116, 143 A. 574, 577 (1928).
14. Commonwealth ex rel. v. Nester, 312 Pa. 484, 486, 167 A. 354, 355
(1933). See generally Blum Bros. v. Girard Nat. Bank, 248 Pa. 148, 93
A. 940 (1915); Schwartz v. Keystone Oil Co., 153 Pa. 283, 25 A. 1018 (1893).
15. Pearson Mfg. Co. v. Pittsburgh Steamboat Co., 309 Pa. 340, 345,
163 A. 680, 682 (1932).
16. Id. See also Warner v. Conn, 347 Pa. 617, 32 A.2d 740 (1943).
17. Schwartz v. Keystone Oil Co., 153 Pa. 283, 286, 25 A. 1018, 1019
(1893).
18. J. High, HIGH ON RECWIVERs 2 (4th ed. 1910).
19. Schwartz v. Keystone Oil Co., 153 Pa. 283, 286, 25 A. 1018, 1019
(1893).
20. See generally Mintzer v. Arthur L. Wright Co., 263 F.2d 823, 825-
26 (3d Cir. 1959).
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tioned on appeal unless a clear abuse is shown.21 No substantive
right is determined by the appointment of a receiver 22 because it is
only a step in the determination of a right, thus ancillary to the pri-
mary action.
23
B. The Historical Considerations
The equitable remedy of appointment of a receiver has been
called one of the oldest remedies of a court of equity,24 and has been
traced back to the early days of the chancery courts in England,
where receivers were once appointed to protect the interest of re-
maindermen. 25 The courts of Pennsylvania did not initially assume
the powers of the chancery courts as developed in England, how-
ever, and it was not until the nineteenth century that chancery
powers were conferred on the state's courts, when "a long standing
and deep-seated objection to the granting of chancery powers was
overcome and the Act of June 16, 1836 ... was passed.
'28
Because the origin was in statutes rather than stare decisis,
Pennsylvania courts could exercise only such powers as the Act of
1836 and a few later acts have given them.27 Pennsylvania courts
also recognize a reservation of the scope of the jurisdiction of the
courts of common pleas based on Article 5 of the Constitution of
1873,28 a factor which has resulted in a specific limitation on the
21. Truscott v. Yiddisher Kultur Farband, 382 Pa. 553, 564, 84 A.2d
555, 562 (1955), citing McDougall v. Huntingdon & Broad Top R. & C.
Co., 294 Pa. 108, 143 A. 574 (1928); Franklin Nat'l Bank v. Kennerly Coal
& Coke Co., 300 Pa. 479, 150 A. 902 (1930). See also Lindenfelser v. Lin-
denfelser, 396 Pa. 530, 153 A.2d 901 (1959).
22. Pussey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U.S. 491 (1923).
23. McDougall v. Huntingdon & Broad Top R. & C. Co., 294 Pa. 108,
117, 143 A. 574, 478 (1928); Hodgsett v. Thompson, 258 Pa. 85, 94, 101 A.
941, 943 (1917).
24. Smith v. Smith, 137 N.J. Eq. 463, 464, 48 A.2d 786, 787 (1946).
25. Ivey v. Housing Foundation of America, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 201
(M.D. Pa. 1947). See also Thompson's Receivership, 25 Pa. Dist. 757, 760
(Fayette 1916).
26. Act of June 16, 1836, P.L. 784, § 13, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 282
(1967); see Penn Anthracite Mining Co. v. Anthracite Miners, 318 Pa. 401,
407, 178 A. 291, 294 (1935).
27. "[T]he courts of Pennsylvania do not possess general chancery
powers, but exercise only such as have been conferred by statute.
Hodgsett v. Thompson, 258 Pa. 85, 91, 101 A. 941, 942 (1917).
28. PA. CONST. art. V, § 20 (1873) provided:
CHANCERY POWERS. The several courts of common pleas,
besides the powers herein conferred, shall have and exercise
within their respective districts, subject to changes as may be
made by law, such chancery powers as are now vested by law
in the several courts of common pleas of this Commonwealth, or
as may hereafter be conferred unon them by law.
The Constitution of 1873 (often called the Constitution of 1874 because it
power of the courts in applying the historical remedy of receiver-
ship.
29
The Act of 1836 gave the court of common pleas of the city
and county of Philadelphia the "powers and jurisdiction of courts
of chancery . . ." in six areas, 30 none of which specifically include
the appointment of receivers. The Constitution of 1873 specifi-
cally limited the chancery powers of the courts of common pleas
to those then vested by law, or which might be later vested in them
by law.3
Later statutes have dealt with the appointment of receivers
in specific situations, particularly insolvency, 32 but there has been
no addition of a general statute governing the appointment of re-
ceivers.33 In this regard, Pennsylvania is unlike some other states
that have "general receivership statutes," indicating in what courts
and in what cases receivers may be appointed,34 and in some in-
stances also allowing an appointment "in all other cases in which
receivers have heretofore been appointed by the usage and rules
of equity.'
5
Absent such a general statute, Pennsylvania courts have nev-
ertheless interpreted the general authority given as to chancery
became effective on January 1, 1874) has been superseded by PA. CONST.
art. V, Schedule to Judiciary Article, § 4 (1968). Corresponding provisions
of previous constitutions include: PA. CONST. § 24 (1776); PA. CONST. art.
V, § 6 (1790) and PA. CONST. art. V, § 6 (1893).
29. See McDougall v. Huntingdon & Broad Top R. & C. Co., 294 Pa.
108, 115, 143 A. 574, 577 (1928); see also Penn Anthracite Mining Co. v.
Anthracite Miners, 318 Pa. 401, 178 A. 291 (1935), for a discussion of the
history of equity powers and jurisdiction in Pennsylvania.
30. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, § 282 (1967) provides that the
court of common pleas for the said city and county of Philadel-
phia* shall, besides the powers and jurisdiction aforesaid, have the
power and jurisdiction of courts of chancery, so far as relates to:
I. The supervision and control of partnerships, and corpora-
tions other than municipal corporations.
II. The care of trust moneys and property, and other moneys
and property made liable to the control of the said courts.
III. The discovery of facts material to a just determination of
issues, and other questions arising or depending in the said courts.
IV. The determination of right to property or money claimed
by two or more persons in the hands or possession of a person
claiming no right of property therein.
V. The prevention or restraint of the commission or continu-
ance of acts contrary to law and prejudicial to the interest of the
community or the rights of individuals.
VI. The affording of specific relief, when a recovery in damages
would be an inadequate remedy. 1836, June 16, P.L. 784, § 13.
*Extended to all the counties of the Commonwealth by Act of Feb.
14, 1857, P.L. 39, § 1. (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 283).
31. See note 28 supra.
32. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, §§ 1-326 (1954).
33. McDougall v. Huntingdon & Broad Top R. & C. Co., 294 Pa. 108,
114, 143 A. 574, 577 (1928).
34. 1 Clark 230-32.
35. Id.; Clark identifies states which have such statutes, including
New York, which has what he calls a "pioneer statute."
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powers to include the authority to appoint receivers."8 The holding
of the court in Butler County v. Pittsburgh, Harmony, Butler &
New Castle Ry. Co."7 exemplifies the breadth of this interpreta-
tion:
The Act of 1836, in giving our courts the jurisdiction and
powers of a court of Chancery in certain cases impliedly
granted them the power to enforce their decrees by any
of the methods ordinarily adopted to compel compliance
with its orders."
In McDougall v. Huntingdon and Broad Top R. & C. Co.,39 one of
few Pennsylvania decisions discussing receivership in any depth,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained the reasoning of the
courts:
It]he principles of equity are broad and comprehensive.
They come into existence as the progress of civilization re-
quires, and are not to be denied merely because a new
subject is to be considered. The jurisdiction of a court
of chancery to appoint a receiver has been assumed for
the advancement of justice; it is founded on the inade-
quacy of the remedy to be obtained in the courts of ordi-
nary jurisdiction .... 40
Clark points out that even where the remedy of appointment
of a receiver has been extended by statute, it is administered, in
the final analaysis, on equitable principles. 41 This result suggests
a difference in means rather than end in Pennsylvania, as the juris-
diction of the Pennsylvania courts is said to rest on equitable princi-
ples, without such a statute.
42
Although it may be asserted that no general statute regarding
the appointment of receivers exists in Pennsylvania, 43 there are
Pennsylvania statutes which deal with specific situations,44 and
the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure contain certain limita-
36. McDougall v. Huntingdon & Broad Top R. & C. Co., 294 Pa. 108,
114, 143 A. 574, 577 (1928).
37. 298 Pa. 347, 148 A. 504 (1929). See also Thompson's Receivership,
25 Pa. Dist. 757 (Fayette 1916) (which takes a still broader view). Contra
Hodgsett v. Thompson, 258 Pa. 85, 95, 101 A. 941, 944 (1917) (overruling
Thompson).
38. Butler County v. Pittsburgh H. B. & N.C. Ry. Co., 298 Pa. 347,
348, 148 A. 504, 505 (1929) (emphasis added).
39. 294 Pa. 108, 143 A. 574 (1928).
40. Id. at 116, 143 A. at 577 (emphasis added).
41. 1 Clark 230-31.
42. McDougall v. Huntingdon & Broad Top R. & C. Co., 294 Pa. 108,
114, 143 A. 574, 577 (1928).
43. Id.
44. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 1-326 (1954) (insolvency). See also
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1-12956 (Supp. 1973) (corporations).
tions.45 Rule 1533,46 entitled "Special Relief-Receivers," provides
for the appointment of a temporary receiver, without notice, "if re-
quired by the exigencies of the case" but requires the filing of a
bond or a posting of security followed by a hearing on the contin-
uation of the appointment after it has been made.
47
Rule 1533 is basically procedural, but the rule also may have
a substantive effect, by allowing the court to refuse the appoint-
ment if security is posted.
48
The somewhat limited statutory base for the appointment of
receivers in Pennsylvania,49 coupled with the infusion of historical
rules governing appointment, 0 has made for few firm areas of the
law of receivers in Pennsylvania, and not surprisingly, for large
areas of grey. "The courts have found it impossible to lay down
positive and unvarying rules which will cover and apply to all
cases which may arise."51 An abundance of general statements of
Pennsylvania rules can be found, but a lack of specific statement of
Pennsylvania interpretation of these rules seems to exist.
III. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: PREREQUISITES
It is undoubtedly true, as the court in Tate5 2 indicated, that no
unvarying or positive rules may be stated regarding the law of re-
ceivers and the incidents of its application. Certainly an impor-
tant point of departure in determining if a receiver may be ap-
pointable in a given situation is the McDougall decision.53 Be-
yond McDougall, there appears to be no clear path to follow. Pre-
cisely because there are no "positive and unvarying rules," one
must grasp the body of decisional law and the attendant statutory
material as a whole in order to catch the threads of reasoning which
bind the Pennsylvania law of receivers together.
Such an approach suggests the following considerations: Re-
ceivership appointments are made in situations in which equity has
45. PA. R. Cirv. P. 1533 (1967). See also notes 8-10 and accompanying
text supra.
46. Id. The rule is a descendant of a series of Pennsylvania Equity
Rules, the history of which is discussed in Amran & Schulman, The New
Pennsylvania Equity Rules; A Survey, 100 PA. L. REv. 1089 (1952).
47. PA. R. CIrv. P. 1533 (1967).
48. PA. R. CIv. P. 1533(c) (1967):
The court may refuse to appoint a receiver for property and
may permit the person in possession to retain it if he gives such
security as the court shall direct. The court may remove a re-
ceiver and restore the property to the person from whom it was
taken if he gives such security as may be required.
49. See notes 32-35 and accompanying text supra.
50. See notes 36-42 and accompanying text supra.
51. Tate v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 410 Pa. 490, 499, 190 A.2d 316,
320 (1963), citing 75 C.J.S. Receivers § 15, at 676-77 (1952).
52. Id.
53. McDougall v. Huntingdon & Broad Top R. & C. Co., 294 Pa. 108,
143 A. 574 (1928). The court states a number of principles that have been
consistently followed since the decision.
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historically afforded relief;5 4 the terms used by the courts are fairly
uniform throughout and suggest that they may be used as "guide-
posts"; 55 certain situations that give rise to prayers for equitable
relief may also prompt consideration of a receiver; and the rules
may change according to the differences in the nature and status
of the parties.5 6
A. Adherence to Basic Equitable Requirements
The determination of when a receiver may be appointed can
be aided at the outset by consideration of whether the necessary
equitable requirements have been met. One of these require-
ments is the historic rule that an equitable remedy will not be
granted where there is an adequate remedy available at law.
57
It has been noted, however, that this rule, "while often stated in
general terms and never directly denied, is often disregarded."58
The basic question considered in this regard, due to the pendente
lite nature of a receivership, is not whether an adequate remedy is
available, but whether the available remedy will be effective to
preserve the rights of the parties. 59 One of the classic grounds for
the appointment of a receiver is thus to preserve the property
which is the subject of litigation when it is in danger of imminent
destruction, loss, or "deterioration or other impairment of value
S. ." or "misconduct or other acts or failures to act on the part of
the defendant or others who are holding the property. . ." is caus-
ing loss or destruction."0 Under such circumstances, a normally
adequate legal remedy may become inadequate.
Sometimes a legal remedy may be available, but it is not ade-
quate because it has been tried and found unsuccessful,6 1 as is the
case where a judgment has been returned unsatisfied.6 2 In Pitts-
54. An example is an action to prevent waste. See notes 120-154 and
accompanying text infra.
55. See Tate v. Philadelphia Trans. Co., 410 Pa. 490, 500, 190 A.2d
316, 321 (1963).
56. See notes 186-275 infra. See Tate v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 410
Pa. 490, 190 A.2d 316 (1963); McDougall v. Huntingdon & Broad Top R.
& C. Co., 294 Pa. 108, 143 A. 574 (1928).
57. See, e.g., McDougall v. Huntingdon & Broad Top R. & C. Co.,
294 Pa. 108, 119, 143 A. 574, 578 (1928).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Zerbe Township School Dist. v. Lark, 54 Pa. D. & C. 427, 452
(North. 1945).
61. A receiver is usually thought of in the pendente lite sense, but
receivers are also often appointed after-judgment. See notes 4-5 and ac-
companying text supra.
62. See Ivey v. Housing Foundation of America, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 201,
202 (M.D. Pa. 1947).
burgh Equitable Meter Co. v. Paul C. Loeber & Co."3 the plaintiff
instituted suit to recover the secret profit he alleged the defendant
had received while acting as an agent for the plaintiff. After exe-
cution was returned unsatisfied, the plaintiff successfully sought
the appointment of a receiver, in aid of execution. The court held
that the plaintiff's right was based on the ground that equity will
come to the aid of one who has exhausted his remedies at law.
4
Where the appointment of a receiver is sought under these circum-
stances, it is sometimes called a creditor's bill, the purpose of
which is to secure satisfaction when the debtor, by fraud, conceal-
ment, or removal from the reach of process has made it impossible
for execution to be completed.6
The appointment in aid of execution constitutes a different
kind of "necessity" from that found in cases in which the assets
or the property in dispute are seemingly subject to impending
loss or deterioration. The latter has a special kind of urgency about
it, which is akin to the necessity required when an injunction is
sought.0 6 Moreover, the power-in-aid-of-a-proceeding-in-equity na-
ture of the remedy of receivership is often used in conjunction
with the injunction.
6
From a practical standpoint, it is clear that there are some sit-
uations in which an injunction may not be effective because a solu-
tion requires more than a one-writing approach can cover, or be-
cause it is clear that an injunction will be ignored.68 In Milasino-
vich v. Serbian Progress Club,69 for instance, a temporary injunction
was issued to stop a club's officers from misuse of its' assets, and a
receiver was appointed to insure preservation of the status quo.
The non-profit organization was embroiled in a dispute among its'
members, and the appointment of the receiver was the court's
means of assuring compliance with its' order.
Preservation of the status quo in a complex situation such as
that which may occur in a dispute between creditors and a corpo-
rate debtor with diversified assets 70 may also be a situation in
63. 160 F.2d 721 (7th Cir. 1947).
64. Id. at 729-29; accord Ivey v. Housing Foundation of America, Inc.,
73 F. Supp. 201, 202 (M.D. Pa. 1947).
65. Hodgsett v. Thompson, 258 Pa. 85, 95, 101 A. 941, 944 (1917).
66. See generally Schwab v. Pottstown Borough, 407 Pa. 531, 180 A.2d
921 (1962); Developments in the Law, Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REv. 994
(1965), discussing receivership among other means of enforcing injunc-
tions; see also J. High, HIGH ON RECEIVERS 737 (4th ed. 1910).
67. Jones v. Weir, 217 Pa. 321, 329, 66 A. 550, 556 (1907).
68. For an analysis of the appointment of receivers in such situations,
where civil rights are involved; see comment, Receivership as a Remedy
in Civil Rights Cases, 24 RUTGERs L. REV. 115 (1969). See also Develop-
ments in the Law, Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1092 (1965).
69. 369 Pa. 26, 84 A.2d 571 (1951).
70. Appointment of a receiver at the instance of a creditor is a com-




which an injunction alone may be less than ideal, because of the
complexity itself. In such a case, a receiver may be a necessary aid
to an injunction.7 ' In other situations, complexity may not be as
much the reason for the necessity of the action as the need for
something physical to be done, such as the maintenance of books or
the carrying on of a business. In one early Pennsylvania case a mill
and machinery were sold at sheriff's sale, and the defendant would
not yield possession. 72 An action in ejectment was filed, and pend-
ing the outcome, a receiver was appointed to take care of the ma-
chinery involved. The court said that it could not deliver title to
the plaintiff, since that would have to be decided at law, but that
they could appoint a receiver to take care of the machinery.
73
B. The Terms as Guideposts
The courts often talk in terms of necessity, a right free from
doubt, a clear right, good reason, and probability of success, when
discussing the appointment of a receiver. 4 Although it is impossi-
ble to state that in every case the same meaning will be attached
to the same phrase, the various terms appear to break down into
two lines of inquiry. The first is directed to the plaintiff's right
or claim to the property that is the subject of the litigation,
whereas the second is directed toward the facts indicating that a
receiver is warranted. The latter is sometimes further directed
to the question of whether a receiver, if appointed, will be useful
in the situation, whether the circumstances are such that one
might be appointed or not.
The term right free from doubt, and its' sister term, clear right,
is a good example of these lines of inquiry. It may refer to the idea
that because the appointment of a receiver interferes with the de-
fendant's property rights, some present legal right to the property
must be shown by the plaintiff at the outset. 75 In such a case, a
"reasonable probability of the plaintiff's ultimate success" must be
shown. 76 On the other hand, it may also mean that the right to an
71. See generally 1 Clark 241; Developments in the Law, Injunctions,
78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1092 (1965).
72. McFadden v. Nolan, 15 Phila 187 (Pa. C.P. 1881).
73. Id. at 188.
74. See Tate v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 410 Pa. 490, 190 A.2d 316
(1963) and McDougall v. Huntingdon & Broad Top R. & C. Co., 294 Pa.
108, 143 A. 574 (1928), in which all of these terms may be found, along
with other similar terms.
75. Mintzer v. Arthur L. Wright Co., 263 F.2d 823, 825 (3d Cir.
1959).
76. United States v. Auditorium Conditioning Corp., 53 F. Supp. 528,
529 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
appointment, from an equitable standpoint, must be free from
doubt or clear." In that case, the equities of the situation, as gov-
erned by a view of the "whole circumstances of the case"78 are
considered, and if there is no showing of expediency or necessity,
the court will not make an appointment.7 9
The term probability of success may similarly refer to a right
of the plaintiff in the property of the defendant which is clearly es-
tablished, not speculative nor uncertain,8 0 or it may refer to the
possibility that a receiver will prove useful in the situation. In
Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission v. Evans,"' the appointment
of a receiver was vacated because it appeared that the defendant
had no property or assets for the receiver to administer, the court
stating that the appointment was not expedient. 82 Regardless of
what a given court meant in using the aforementioned terms at a
given time, they stand as guideposts for the rules that the plain-
tiff must have a right in the property that is the subject of the
litigation,8 3 and that the effect of a potential appointment will be
examnedu fron every viewpoint, tU incl-udet q1 u..ities of "I^ -"*'"
ation8 4 and the utility in the situation.88
Right free from doubt and probability of success tie into an-
other common statement, that a receivership must not be the
sole relief asked for. No substantive right is determined by the ap-
pointment of a receiver,8 6 because it is only a step in the determina-
tion of a right, and as such is -strictly ancillary to the primary ac-
tion.ST "There is no occasion for a court of equity to appoint a re-
ceiver of property of which it is asked to make no further disposi-
tion."88 A petition requesting the appointment of a receiver and
nothing more cannot be approved because it requests no ultimate
relief to which a right free from doubt may be ascribed.
89
77. See, e.g., Tate v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 410 Pa. 490, 500, 190
A.2d 316, 321 (1963).
78. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n v. Evans, 13 Pa. D. & C.2d 290,
292 (Dauph. 1957), aff'd, 392 Pa. 110, 129 A.2d 530 (1958); see also Beau-
mont v. Beaumont, 166 Pa. 615, 616, 31 A. 336 (1895).
79. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n v. Evans, 13 Pa. D. & C.2d 290,
292 (Dauph. 1957), aff'd, 392 Pa. 110, 129 A.2d 530 (1958).
80. United States v. Auditorium Conditioning Corp., 53 F. Supp. 528,
529 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
81. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n v. Evans, 13 Pa. D. & C.2d 290
(Dauph. 1957), aff'd, 392 Pa. 110, 129 A.2d 530 (1958).
82. Id. at 299.
83. See note 75 and accompanying text supra.
84. See note 78 and accompanying text supra.
85. See Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n v. Evans, 13 Pa. D. & C.2d
290 (Dauph. 1956), aff'd, 392 Pa. 110, 129 A.2d 530 (1958).
86. Pussey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U.S. 491 (1923).
87. McDougall v. Huntingdon & Broad Top R. & C. Co., 294 Pa. 108,
117, 143 A. 574, 578 (1928); Hodgsett v. Thompson, 258 Pa. 85, 94, 101 A.
941, 943 (1917); Schwartz v. Keystone Oil Co., 153 Pa. 283, 286, 25 A. 1018,
1019 (1893); Globe Solvents, Inc. v. Nouskhajian, 148 Pa. Super. 202, 209,
24 A.2d 687, 690 (1942).
88. Gordon v. Washington, 295 U.S. 30, 37 (1934).
89. The rule is recognized in McDougall v. Huntingdon & Broad Top
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In Isaac v. Milton Manufacturing Co.,90 where the appointment
of a receiver was sought along with an accounting, the prayer was
denied because no final decree for the disposition of the property
sought to be placed under the receiver's control was to be deter-
mined.91
The word necessity also suggests some guideposts, and is a
term used liberally in receivership decisions, where courts will not
hesitate to point out that the appointment must be "necessary."
For example, in McDougall v. Huntingdon and Broad Top R. &
C. Co.,0 2 the court combined many of the preceding terms and ob-
served that "receivers will not be appointed unless the chancellor
is convinced that the right is free from doubt, the loss irreparable,
with no adequate legal remedy, and the relief sought is necessary. 3
This irreparable nature of the loss that may result if a receiver is
not appointed, and the belief that greater damage will result if
no appointment is made than if one is made, is the primary mean-
ing of necessity in the context of receivership.
94
Pennsylvania courts are also quick to characterize the remedy
as drastic when discussing the nature of the necessity that must be
apparent to consider an appointment. 5 In the sense that the
remedy deprives the defendant of property rights by interfering
with his exercise of control over the property before a final deter-
mination is made, the remedy is indeed a drastic one, and thus must
be very necessary.
98
Also underscoring the drastic nature of the remedy is the
R. & C. Co., 294 Pa. 108, 117, 143 A. 574, 577 (1928) (will not be appointed
where receivership is the sole relief asked for). See also Bowman v. Gum
Inc., 321 Pa. 516, 525, 184 A. 258, 262 (1936); Globe Solvents, Inc. v. Nousk-
hajian, 148 Pa. Super. 202, 209, 24 A.2d 687, 690 (1942). For a discussion
of receivership in the federal courts, where state law is not necessarily
applied, see Comment, Equitable Remedy of Receivership, State Law in
the Federal Courts, 10 STAN. L. REv. 361 (1958).
90. 33 F. Supp. 732 (M.D. Pa. 1940).
91. Id. at 735. The plaintiff sought the accounting in order to have
a report made for his convenience, as distinguished from the situation in
which one of two persons who have an equal interest in some property
fails to allow the other to inspect the asset or assets and an account is
ordered to aid the plaintiff in doing so.
92. McDougall v. Huntingdon & Broad Top R. & C. Co., 294 Pa. 108,
143 A. 574 (1928).
93. Id. at 117, 143 A. at 578 (emphasis added).
94. See Tate v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 410 Pa. 490, 500, 190 A.2d
291, 321 (1963).
95. Id.
96. See Mintzer v. Arthur L. Wright Co., 263 F.2d 823, 824 (3d Cir.
1959).
use of the term extraordinary,97 which is often emphasized in point-
ing out that the remedy is an exception and not the rule.98 A re-
ceivership is not normally imposed by a court independent of the
request of some interested party.9 9 These characterizations clearly
suggest that the remedy of a receiver will always involve a show-
ing of unusual need, the power to appoint being a "delicate one
and one which is justly safeguarded and reluctantly exercised by
the courts."'10 0 It is "used sparingly, with caution and circum-
spection and only in an extreme case, under circumstances as de-
mand or require summary relief."'' 1  In McDougal °102 the court
noted that "there is nothing . . . which effects a corporation with
such serious consequences as does the appointment of a re-
ceiver; it is a severe, and may be termed an heroic remedy ....
The McDougall court went on to say that the drastic nature of the
appointment was such that all of the circumstances of the case
would be considered with a view to the potential benefit or detri-
ment to each of the parties concerned. 0 4 This view, which encom-
passes all the circumstances, ralner Lhan Just the cl se1 h =
ties involved, emphasizes how drastic and extraordinary an ap-
pointment is considered to be. The process in determination of the
.difficult question of necessity is a balancing test, in which the
harm accruing to the plaintiff by denial of relief must clearly over-
balance harm that may be caused to the defendant (and to those
around him) if the appointment is made. 0
5
As previously noted, being an equitable remedy, the question
of appointment, when raised, is not decided by a jury, but is a
matter for the discretion of the court.'08  Because of this discre-
tionary nature, which is underlined by the court's naturally cau-
tious attitude toward such a drastic remedy, a receivership will not
ordinarily be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of the trial court's
discretion is clearly shown.'0 7 The issue on appeal is thus always
97. McDougall v. Huntingdon & Broad Top R. & C. Co., 294 Pa. 108,
116, 143 A. 574, 577 (1928).
98. Truscott v. Yiddisher Kultur Farband, 382 Pa. 553, 568, 84 A.2d
555, 562 (1955).
99. Id.
100. Tate v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 410 Pa. 490, 500, 190 A.2d 316,
321 (1963).
101. Id.
102. McDougall v. Huntingdon & Broad Top R. & C. Co., 294 Pa. 108,
143 A. 574 (1928).
103. Id. at 117, 143 A. at 578.
104. Id.
105. Mintzer v. Arthur L. Wright Co., 263 F.2d 823, 824 (3d Cir.
1959).
106. See note 19 and accompanying text supra. See generally Mintzer
v. Arthur L. Wright Co., 263 F.2d 823, 825-26 (3d Cir. 1959).
107. Truscott v. Yiddisher Kultur Farband, 382 Pa. 553, 564, 84 A.2d
555, 561 (1955), see Franklin Nat'l Bank v. Kennerly Coal & Coke Co.,
300 Pa. 479, 150 A. 902 (1930). See also Lindenfelser v. Lindenfelser, 396
Pa. 530, 153 A.2d 901 (1959); Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n v. Evans,
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the question of the use of discretion, a factor which must be con-
sidered in relation to the balancing test employed.108
In Bowman v. Gum, Inc.109 a temporary receiver was appointed
for Gum on the petition of a shareholder who owned one-half of
the stock in the corporation, based on an alleged conspiracy of
the defendant directors. The shareholder felt that the corporate
affairs were being conducted by the defendants in their own,
rather than the corporate interests. The court held that a tempo-
rary receiver should not have been appointed for a solvent corpora-
tion based on the mere conjecture of a stockholder, even though
the stockholder did hold one-half of the stock."l 0 The appointment
was held to be an abuse of discretion, the court noting that it was
"of course, a laudable hope, as was said below, that if the tempo-
rary receiver is appointed, quarreling interests [would] reconcile
their differences; they may or they may not .. . ."I" Necessity in
this situation failed to overcome the drastic step of taking the cor-
porate property out of the management's hands.
Although the Bowman case represents the kind of question
presented in many of the appeals, an abuse of discretion may con-
sist of a lack of jurisdiction in equity,112 and, there have been cases
in which the plaintiff has appealed claiming it was an abuse not
to appoint." 3 In at least one instance, the plaintiff has prevailed.114
The discretionary nature of the remedy leads to the obvious
conclusion that the appointment of a receiver is by no means a
right.
Since no litigant can force a judge to do a judicial act
which involves judicial discretion . ..no litigant has an
absolute right to have the court take another's property
into its' custody by the appointment of a receiver. .... 115
Because the appointment of a receiver normally has this certain
urgency about it, 1 6 the plaintiff seeking an appointment may find
that the damage is done before appellate review can be accom-
13 Pa. D. & C.2d 290 (Dauph. 1957), aff'd, 392 Pa. 110, 139 A.2d 530
(1958).
108. Id.
109. 321 Pa. 516, 184 A. 258 (1936).
110. Id. at 525, 184 A. at 258.
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Hodgsett v. Thompson, 258 Pa. 85, 101 A. 941 (1917).
113. See McDougall v. Huntingdon & Broad Top R. & C. Co., 294 Pa.
108, 143 A. 574 (1928) (The case was heard as an appeal from a dismissal
of plaintiff's petition for a receiver).
114. See Lindenfelser v. Lindenfelser, 396 Pa. 530, 153 A.2d 901 (1959).
115. 1 Clark 52.
116. See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
plished. Because the plaintiff has no right to an appointment, he
must convince the court to see the situation as he does. Accord-
ingly, in order to make the remedy work for him, he must have ap-
proval on the first try. On the other hand, if he can show neces-
sity, a right free from doubt, that a receiver can clearly be useful,
and that the situation is extraordinary, he will have touched the
guideposts as discussed so far, and he may get his appointment and
accomplish his purpose of keeping an asset intact. Because the
prerequisites are many, the cases on the subject are few.1 1 7
IV. THE RELATION OF AN EQUITABLE CAUSE OF
ACTION: WASTE AS AN EXAMPLE
Due to the equitable origin of receivership, the historic grounds
upon which equity jurisdiction is based must invariably be present
where an appointment is sought.1 ' Thus, it may be helpful in
determining if a receiver is appointable in a given situation to ana-
lyze the Pennsylvania receivership cases in terms of the causes of
action upon which suits have been brought. The action of waste
provides a convenient vehicle for such scrutiny. Because the de-
cisions are few, however, 1 0 such a review does not necessarily
yield a consistent set of rules.
Danger to the property involved has been an historical basis
for the appointment of a receiver 20 and is often a primary fact
proved in seeking the appointment of a receiver.' 21 In Zerbe
Township School District v. Lark,122 land which had been the sub-
ject of a County Treasurer's sale and purchased by the County Com-
missioners was being diminished in value by the continued mining
and removal of coal. A school district and the township in which
the land was located, both of which had claims for unpaid taxes
against the land, brought suit alleging that the County Commis-
sioners were remiss in their duties in allowing the value of the
land to be so diminished. Commenting on the petition to have a
receiver appointed and an injunction to prevent the waste issued,
the court, citing Clark12 3 noted that:
The general equity ground for the appointment of a
receiver is therefore, that the property in dispute is either
in danger of loss, destruction, deterioration, or other im-
pairment of value through neglect, waste or misconduct
or other acts or failures to act .... 124
117. See Mintzer v. Arthur L. Wright Co., 263 F.2d 823, 826 (3d Cir.
1959).
118. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
119. Id.
120. Mintzer v. Arthur L. Wright Co., 263 F.2d 823, 826 (3d Cir. 1959).
121. Id. at 826.
122. 54 Pa. D. & C. 427, 452 (North. 1945).
123. 1 Clark 204.




A receiver was appointed on the theory that the county held
the land as trustee for the benefit of all the tax levying authorities.
The decision was based on the specific provisions of the Act of June
8, 1891,125 since superseded by Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, Rule 1576, which provided that anyone having a contingent
interest in given land could apply for the appointment of a re-
ceiver to prevent the commission of waste. Although the specific
authority of the act has been superseded, the case is a good exam-
ple for the proposition that the appointment of a receiver is not
considered unless there is an equitable ground, such as waste.126
Moreover, the court in Mintzer v. Arthur L. Wright Co.127 points
out that this requirement is not based on statute, by observing
that "[a]lthough the Pennsylvania decisions are few, the common
law rule is clear that where there is no fraud or imminent danger
of the property being lost, injured, diminished in value, or squan-
dered . . . the appointment of a receiver should not be granted.'
128
The current provision regarding receivers and waste, Rule 1576,
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure-Actions to Prevent
Waste, 129 provides that "the court may, in a proper case, appoint a
receiver in accordance with Rule 1533.' ' 30 The basic provision
of this rule is found in subsection (a), which provides for an in-
junction pendente lite to restrain waste of real property involved
in an action at law or in equity.
131
Actions to prevent waste may also be found in suits by mort-
gagees to prevent impairment of the value of the mortgaged prop-
erty,132 although actual physical injury to property may be re-
quired. In Abraham Rosenblatt Building and Loan Association v.
Miller,133 a mortgagee petitioned to have a receiver appointed to
collect rents and profits accruing to the mortgaged premises while
normal foreclosure proceedings were in progress. The mortgagee
claimed that the failure of the mortgagor to apply the rents and
125. Act of June 8, 1891, P.L. 208, § 1 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1468,
suspended by PA. R. Cirv. P. 1581.
126. 1 Clark 204. See also Pittsburgh Equitable Meter Co. v. Paul C.
Loeber & Co., 160 F.2d 721, 728 (7th Cir. 1947).
127. 263 F.2d 823 (3d Cir. 1959).
128. Id. at 826.
129. PA. R. Civ. P. 1576 (1967).
130. PA. R. Civ. P. 1533 (1967) (providing for limitations with regard
to the appointment of receivers); see also notes 8-10 and accompanying
text supra.
131. PA. R. CIrv. P. 1576(a) (1967).
132. See Gordon v. Washington, 295 U.S. 30, 37. See also Galey v.
Guffey, 248 Pa. 523, 94 A. 238 (1915); Abraham Rosenblatt Bldg. and Loan
Ass'n v. Miller, 13 Pa. D. & C. 73 (Phila. 1929).
133. 13 Pa. D. & C. 73 (Phila. 1929).
profits to the payment of the interest of the mortgage and to taxes
constituted waste. Absent "actual waste," the court denied the pe-
tition for want of equitable jurisdiction.
134
A similar basis for the finding that a receiver was not war-
ranted was reached in Schlect's Appeal,'35 where the court held
that without an equitable ground for jurisdiction, there is no au-
thority to appoint a receiver for one in possession of the property
that is the subject of the litigation.
136
Another example may be found where it is claimed that, be-
tween two persons equally entitled to the property which is the
subject of the litigation, one has been guilty of commission of waste
to the detriment of the other. Such was the case in Francis v. Fran-
cis,'
8 7 where the plaintiff sought an accounting for her share of the
profits of an equal partnership. The defendant was subsequently
ordered to account, and an injunction was issued ordering him to
cease dissipation of the assets. It later appeared that the defend-
ant partner had control of the real estate and the worth was being
depleted, notwithstanding the injunction. The plaintiff then peti-
tioned for a receiver, claiming that if one was not appointed, irrep-
arable injury would be done to the property. A receiver was then
appointed, under the provisions of Rule 1576.138
Akin to the appointment to prevent waste is the situation pre-
sented when perishable goods are involved in a dispute. Other
jurisdictions have appointed receivers in such a circumstance, to
sell, collect, or preserve the perishable property,13 9 and it appears
that the Pennsylvania courts would do so also, based on the possi-
bility of waste.140 The Insolvency Act141 provides for the conserva-
tion of perishable property by specifically providing that "prop-
erty of a perishable nature or likely to deteriorate in value may
be sold by leave of the court .... ,,142 and, the receiver appointed
under the Insolvency Act may substitute the proceeds from the sale
in lieu of the property so sold.
The prevention of waste as a ground is not necessarily limited
to deterioration of real property, but may also be applied to destruc-
tion of personalty, as is pointed out by Devlin v. Devlin,"43 in which
a bill was filed to protect the rights of creditors of a business by
134. Id. at 75.
135. 60 Pa. 172 (1869).
136. Id. at 173.
137. 56 Del. 245 (Pa. C.P. 1968).
138. PA. R. Civ. P. 1576(c) (1967).
139. Harned v. Rowand, 132 N.J. Eq. 97, 26 A.2d 865 (1942) (sell per-
ishable property); Federal Land Bank v. Lloyd, 224 Ala. 48, 138 S. 417
(1931) (gather crop).
140. See Rodgers v. Black, 15 Pa. Super. 498 (1901); Black v. Black,
93 F. 346 (1899).
141. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, §§ 1-326 (1954).
142. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 35 (1954).
143. 65 Sch. L.R. 35 (Pa. C.P. 1966).
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having it carried on by a receiver. The "reckless dimunition of the
assets to the detriment of the rights of the petitioning creditor and
other creditors of the defendant . . .,,144 was considered in that
case, and the appointment of a receiver approved. Similarly, where
a dispute between two contributors to a joint enterprise threat-
ened to diminish the joint assets, the appointment of a receiver
was held justified to conserve the property and the rights of all
parties concerned.
145
The appointment of a receiver in an action to prevent waste
is thus recognized in Pennsylvania in a few cases,146 and waste
has been recognized by the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure
as an area in which receivers may be appointed. 147
To the general rule that waste may be a ground for the ap-
pointment of a receiver, indeed, to the proposition that an equi-
table ground is required, could be added a host of other categories of
behavior which impinge on the rights of another and which give
rise to the appointment of a receiver in a specific kind of fact situ-
ation. Some of these include the aforementioned "creditor's bill."' 48
in which a receiver is requested in aid of execution, where fraud is
alleged,149 where insolvency is averred,150 where mismanagement
of property or assets is shown such as to amount to waste,'5 or
where the owner of the property has absconded."52
This brief look at one of the classic grounds for equitable re-
144. Id. at 35.
145. Sellers v. Hanratty, 343 Pa. 316, 317, 22 A.2d 697, 698 (1944)
(court authorized a sale of the property involved to bring about distribu-
tion of assets).
146. See, e.g., Francis v. Francis, 56 Del. 245 (Pa. C.P. 1968); Zerbe
Township School Distr. v. Lark, 54 D. & C. 427 (Pa. C.P. 1945); McFadden
v. Nolan, 15 Phila. 187 (Pa. C.P. 1881).
147. PA.R. CIV. P. 1576(c) (1967).
148. See note 65 and accompanying text supra.
149. See Adelman v. CGS Scientific Corporation, 332 F. Supp. 137
(E.D. Pa. 1971) (Fraudulent Conveyance); Globe Solvents, Inc. v. Nousk-
hajian, 148 Pa. Super. 202, 24 A.2d 687 (1942) (fraud in dealing with cred-
itors); Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n v. Evans, 13 Pa. D. & C.2d 290
(Dauph. 1957), aff'd, 382 Pa. 110, 139 A.2d 530 (1958) (conspiracy to de-
fraud). Although fraud alone may not be enough: cf. Ivey v. Housing
Foundation of America, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 201, 203 (M.D. Pa. 1947).
150. Pennsylvania has a specific statute covering appointment of a re-
ceiver in an insolvency situation. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, §§ 1-326 (1954).
151. Shapiro v. Shapiro, 424 Pa. 120, 224 A.2d 626 (1956) (dispute be-
tween tenants by the entireties); Bowman v. Gum, Inc., 321 Pa. 516, 184
A. 258 (1936) (corporate mismanagement); Franklin Nat'l Bank v. Ken-
nerly Coal & Coke Co., 300 Pa. 479, 150 A. 902 (1930) (same).
152. Devlin v. Devlin, 65 Sch. L.R. 35 (Pa. C.P. 1966). See also Jeantet
v. Allbrand Appliance & Television, Inc., 20 N.Y. Misc. 2d 94, 189 N.Y.S.2d
722 (1959).
lief demonstrates that in addition to the prerequisites suggested by
the "guideposts,"1 3 there must also be a demonstrated equitable
basis for appointment shown for a receiver to be considered. In
some areas, the legislature has complemented or supplemented the
equitable grounds, as is the case with waste. 154 In other areas,
there may be no legislative guidelines, and it has thus been said
that the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania courts in regard to re-
ceivers is governed by equitable principles.155
V. CONSIDERATION OF THE PARTIES INVOLVED
AS AN ANALYTICAL GUIDELINE
The preceding discussion emphasizes the need to consider
many variables in attempting to determine if a request for the ap-
pointment of a receiver to hold the property in controversy pend-
ing legislation, or to aid in effecting execution following litigation,
will prove successful. An examination of the facts in light of the
historic power of the courts to grant equitable remedies, a check to
determine if the general quality of the situation is consistent with
the "guideposts" that the case law has set out, and consideration of
whether the basis for the request for relief (e.g., waste, fraud) is
one with which the ancillary relief of a receivership will normally
be combined, are all useful in an attempt to predict the success of a
given prayer to appoint. Assuming that all of these prerequisites
have been examined and are met, it still may not be possible to
make a reliable determination, because the parties involved may
significantly affect the rules which come into play.
Although it is impossible to completely separate the various
party situations, it is helpful to categorize the general fact situa-
tions according to the interests of the parties involved. It is sub-
mitted that the Pennsylvania decisions may be separated into four
general "party categories" in which the appointment of a receiver
has been sought:
(a) At the instance of a person or persons holding a share-
holder, stockholder, or managerial interest in a corporation, unin-
corporated association, proposed corporation, or similar business
venture, including a public enterprise type corporation.
(b) At the instance of a person or person holding an inter-
est in property by virtue of contribution to a partnership or joint
enterprise.
(c) At the instance of a person or persons equally entitled
to possession of property.
(d) At the instance of a creditor or creditors of an individual,
partnership, or corporation.
153. See note 74 and accompanying text supra.
154. PA. R. Crv. P. 1576(c) (1967).
155. McDougall v. Huntingdon & Broad Top R. & C. Co., 294 Pa. 108,
114, 143 A. 574, 577 (1928).
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A. Parties: Shareholders/Stockholders of a Corporation
The authority to appoint a receiver for the assets of a corpo-
ration is firmly established in Pennsylvania, based on the view that
the courts have unlimited jurisdiction in equity with respect to
corporations as provided for in the provisions of the Act of 1836."15
This act specifically provides that the courts of common pleas will
have chancery powers and jurisdiction with regard to corporations
and partnerships.
157
This authority serves as a basis for the appointment of re-
ceivers for corporations, generally, 5 8 and the Pennsylvania legisla-
ture has enacted provisions that relate to corporations specifically,
including the Insolvency Act 5 9 and the Business Corporation
Law,160 both of which contain procedure for the appointment of re-
ceivers.16 ' In spite of the fact that these provisions exist, many of
the Pennsylvania cases rest on equitable causes of action such as
fraud or waste (in the form of mismanagement), apparently be-
cause the parties were not insolvent or not corporations, because
the equitable approach was deemed more suitable to the situation,
or because the decision predates the statutes.162
The failure of corporate purpose may be a basis for the equi-
table remedy of a receivership, as was the case in Garland v. Wil-
son, 63 where an appointment was sought at the instance of a
shareholder to take over the assets of a proposed corporation that
had failed. The plea for a receiver was held appropriate in such
a case.164 The Business Corporation Law now has a specific provi-
sion under which dissolution proceedings may be begun where the
corporate purpose is no longer being carried out.165 The failure of
corporate purpose was recognized as grounds for an equitable re-
156. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 282-283 (1967). See also PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17, § 285 (1967), dealing with shareholders of a corporation specifically.
157. See notes 26-31 and accompanying text supra. See also McDou-
gall v. Huntingdon & Broad Top R. & C. Co., 294 Pa. 108, 115-16, 143 A.
574, 577-78 (1928).
158. Id.
159. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, §§ 1-326 (1954).
160. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1001-3000 (1967).
161. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 31 (1954) (Insolvency Act); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1513.1, 2108 (1967) (Business Corporation Law pro-
visions dealing with shareholders).
162. See Tate v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 410 Pa. 490, 190 A.2d 321
(1963); McDougall v. Huntingdon & Broad Top R. & C. Co., 294 Pa. 108,
143 A. 574 (1928). The BusINEss ComoRATIoN LAW was enacted in 1933.
163. 289 Pa. 272, 137 A. 266 (1927).
164. Id. at 276, 137 A. at 268.
165. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1107 (1967).
ceiver in Hall v. Park City Brewing Company,'6 6 'an early case
where the onset of prohibition caused the corporate purpose to fail.
The court in Hall specifically considered whether a court of
equity had jurisdiction to appoint a receiver to distribute the assets
of a solvent corporation, where the purpose had failed, and
if the court could regulate such a corporation's affairs, and con-
cluded that:
[w] here there is a failure of corporate purposes, or where
inevitable ruin will follow corporate acts, the affairs of
a solvent corporation may be wound up at the instance
of a stockholder through the appointment of a receiver
167
Fraud or mismanagement are also grounds for appointment of
a receiver under the Corporation Law, where a shareholder may
seek to have the corporation dissolved and a receiver appointed, 163
although it was originally held that where a corporation remains
solvent, a minority stockholder could not prevail where his claim
is based on tile mere belief that the corppration my fail if the al-
leged mismanagement were to continue.16 9 Under a recent addi-
tion to the Business Corporation Law,1 70 when a deadlock occurs
which paralyzes the corporation's ability to do business, or where
there is fraud, mismanagement, or waste, a custodian with the pow-
ers of a receiver may be appointed to carry on the business with-
out liquidating it. In spite of such statutory provisions, it must be
emphasized that the appointment, where fraud, mismanagement,
failure of purpose or deadlock is charged, is still subject to the dis-
cretion of the court,' 7 ' and where necessity is not shown, no ap-
pointment may be made.
1 72
Under the statutory apparatus, the shareholder may also have
another route to a receivership. Through his vote in the corporate
structure, a voluntary winding-up is possible, under which the di-
rectors of a corporation have the option of applying to the court
to have the assets of the business placed under the court's control,
which the court would normally accomplish via a receivership. 73
In addition to the statutory provisions and the cases briefly dis-
cussed, a review of earlier cases in which receivers have been ap-
166. 294 Pa. 127, 143 A. 582 (1928).
167. Id. at 129, 143 A. at 583, citing Annot. 43 A.L.R. 296.
168. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2107 (1967).
169. Bowman v. Gum, Inc., 321 Pa. 516, 525, 184 A. 258, 262 (1936).
170. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1513.7 (Supp. 1973) (added in 1968, Act
of July 20, 1968, P.L. 459, No. 216, § 30).
171. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n v. Evans, 13 Pa. D. & C.2d 290,
292 (Dauph. 1957), aff'd, 392 Pa. 110, 139 A.2d 530 (1958) (No appointment
because not expedient); Oppenheimer v. Bland, 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 243 (Sch.
1956) (No appointment where only effect was to delay creditors).
172. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, v. Evans, 13 Pa. D. & C.2d 290,
292 (Dauph. 1957) aff'd, 392 Pa. 110, 139 A.2d 530 (1958).
173. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2104 (1967).
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pointed is helpful. McDougall v. Huntingdon & Broad Top R. &
C. Co.,1 7 4 in which cases are collected that deal with dissension
among stockholders, 1 5 situations in which a corporation lacks gov-
erning officers,176 and gross misconduct by the corporate offi-
cers,17 7 is of assistance in this regard.
The McDougall court, commenting on the advantages of a
receivership in situations in which there is fraud, mismanage-
ment, deadlock, lack of officers, or failure of purpose, noted that:
[t] he old rule stated that where insolvency, fraud and mis-
management existed courts would not interfere by the ap-
pointment of a receiver, but would enjoin illegal acts, and
direct prosecution of the officers. This is all [now] accom-
plished through a receivership, and the faithless officers
are removed from further temptation.
7 8
It should be observed that the Business Corporation Law con-
tains very broad language in granting power to the courts of com-
mon pleas where a voluntary or an involuntary dissolution oc-
curs. The act gives the courts of common pleas "all the ordinary
powers of a court of equity . . . to appoint a receiver or receivers,
pendente lite, with such powers and duties as the court . . .may
direct ... 11,171 until a hearing may be had. The courts are also
given the power to appoint a liquidating receiver. 8 0 It should also
be noted that there are certain forms of corporate activity that are
covered by specifically applicable separate acts, including insurance
companies, banks, savings associations, and title insurance com-
panies.181
Appointment of an equitable receiver is not limited to profit
seeking, going corporations. In Biancardi v. Society of Christo-
pher Columbus' s 2 a receiver was appointed for a nonprofit unin-
174. McDougall v. Huntingdon & Broad Top R. & C. Co., 294 Pa. 108,
143 A. 574 (1928).
175. Id. at 119-20, 143 A. at 579.
176. Id. at 120, 143 A. at 579.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 122, 143 A. 580.
179. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2108(A) (1967).
180. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2108(B) (1967). The pendente lite re-
ceiver should normally be termed a temporary receiver, the liquidating
receiver a permanent receiver. See notes 7-11 and accompanying text su-
pra.
181. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1004 (1967) (listing statutes); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 733-605, 733-606, 733-701 (1952) (banks); PA. STAT.
ANrN. tit. 40, § 210 (1967) (insurance companies); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40,
§ 167 (1971) (title insurance companies); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 31
(1954). For a more comprehensive review of the statutes involved, see
8 PA. STD. PRACT. 571 (1962).
182. 45 Lack. Jur 89 (Pa. C.P. 1944).
corporated beneficial association. Similarly, in Milasinovich v. Ser-
bian Progress Club,'8 3 an appointment was approved for a non-
profit corporation, and in Garland v. Wilson, 8 4 a receiver was ap-
pointed for an abortive corporation.
Where a corporation is involved, and a shareholder or stock-
holder seeks to have a receiver appointed, the rule seems firmly
established in Pennsylvania that a receiver will be appointed when
the equities of the situation demand such a measure,'8 5 and, the
situations which have been identified by the courts and the legis-
lature include fraud, mismanagement, waste of corporate assets,
deadlock, or failure of purpose.
B. Parties: Partners/Partnership/Joint Enterprise
The same provisions of the Act of 1836 that gave the courts of
common pleas jurisdiction and powers of the courts of chancery
with regard to corporations also gave the courts such powers with
regard to partnerships. 8 6
Although a suit by a shareholder of a corporation may in-
volve important questions of minority stockholders rights8 7 and
complex rules regarding dissolution and deadlock situations, 8 8 the
partnership, because of the relative simplicity of the association in
terms of the number of persons involved, may involve a disagree-
ment of only two persons, each of whom has an equal right to have
his say. When such an altercation occurs, suits are sometimes
brought to force an accounting, for a partition of the jointly held
property, for a dissolution, or for all three.
In Jones v. Weir, 8 9 where the plaintiff claimed that he was
induced to form a partnership by false representations, a dissolu-
tion was sought, along with the appointment of a receiver. The
court noted that: "[w]hen a dissolution is intended, or has al-
ready taken place, a court of equity will always appoint a receiver,
provided there be some breach of duty of a partner or of the con-
tract of the partnership ... ."190 The court further commented on
partnerships and receivers by noting that:
[i] t is difficult to see how the necessity of a receiver can
be avoided, on the dissolution of a partnership, when the
parties cannot agree as to the disposition of the joint ef-
fects, for for no one has a right to their possession and
control superior to that of the other.' 9'
183. 396 Pa. 26, 84 A.2d 571 (1951). See note 69 and accompanying
text supra.
184. 289 Pa. 272, 137 A. 266 (1927). See notes 163-64 supra.
185. See notes 116-17 and accompanying text supra.
186. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 282-83 (1967). See note 31 supra.
187. See, e.g., Cunliffe v. Consumers Ass'n of America, 280 Pa. 263,
124 A. 501 (1924).
188. See Bowman v. Gum, 321 Pa. 516, 184 A. 258 (1936).
189. 217 Pa. 321, 66 A. 550 (1907).
190. Id. at 329, 66 A. at 552-53.
191. Id., 66 A. at 553.
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In Jones the court said it had given the partners "every oppor-
tunity" to settle their differences, with no result.192 In Moyn v.
Rose, 9 3 where wrongful conduct was charged on the part of de-
fendant partners in connection with the disposition of the assets
of a proposed grocery store chain (of which two stores were actu-
ally in the hands of the defendant), a receiver was appointed
and the appointment upheld, along with an order for an accounting.
In addition to wrongful conduct or fraud and circumstances sug-
gesting that dissolution is intended or has occurred, the waste of
partnership assets may also be a proper ground for the consider-
ation of an appointment, as was found in Francis v. Francis.194 In
that case, one of the partners was depleting partnership assets in
spite of having been enjoined from doing so, and a receiver was ap-
pointed to take over the assets to conserve the property. 9 5
Disposition of jointly held assets as part of a dissolution, may
also involve a partition action. Such disposition was the subject of
comment in Sellers v. Hanratty,9 6 where the court said that:
so far as the appointment of a receiver is concerned, we
think it was justified to preserve the property and the
rights of the parties concerned and to bring about by sale
the equitable distribution of the proceeds. 19
In an early case, 98 one partner assigned accounts due to a
trustee for the benefit of creditors, the other confessed judgments on
or assigned some of the same accounts, and a complex question of
who had what right in what asset arose. A charge was made
that one partner had violated the other's rights, and the creditors
were in dispute as to priorities, due to the action of each partner
in dealing with them. The court said that the appointment of a
receiver in that situation was the "only adequate remedy by which
the interests of all parties concerned could be preserved."'19 9
As is the case with regard to the internal disputes of corpora-
tions, it cannot be said that any of the cases create a precedent
under which receivers will always be appointed. All of the con-
siderations of the preceding discussion must again be taken into
account. For example, in Beaumont v. Beaumont,20 0 an early
192. Id., 66 A. at 552.
193. 245 Pa. 601, 92 A. 39 (1914).
194. 56 Del 245 (Pa. C.P. 1968).
195. Id.
196. 343 Pa. 316, 22 A.2d 697 (1944).
197. Id. at 319, 22 A.2d at 698, citing 1 J. High, HIH ON REcEIvERs
§ 606 (4th ed. 1910). See generally 47 C.J.S. 397. See also note 145 supra.
198. Fox v. Curtis, 176 Pa. 52, 34 A. 952 (1896).
199. Id. at 58, 34 A. at 953.
200. 166 Pa. 615, 31 A. 336 (1895).
case that is sometimes cited to illustrate this point,201 a dissolu-
tion, accounting, and the appointment of a receiver was sought
where there was an allegation that one of the partners had failed
to keep books or otherwise properly discharge his obligations to
the partnership. The court did not allow the appointment of a re-
ceiver, and the refusal to appoint was upheld. It was said that
"no positive and unvarying rule can be laid down as applicable to
all cases. If there be no danger to the property and nothing to show
the necessity or expediency of appointing a receiver, none should be
appointed.
20 2
In spite of the limitations imposed by the prerequisites, the
partnership cases may be particularly appropriate for the remedy
of a receiver. Two or more persons having an equal right in the
property, the failure of one to discharge duties, or his activities in
destroying the interests of the other, or the activities of both in so
doing, make a neutral administrator pending disposition of the
property attractive. An added consideration in application of the
remedy is the fact that where a corporation is involved, there are
officers, directors, shareholders, etc., who may be able to have some
influence in stopping irrational acts, while in the partnership situ-
ation, one or the other partner may have sufficient personal con-
trol over all the assets to be able to easily affect them adversely.
C. Parties: Persons Equally Entitled to Possession of Property
The appointment of a receiver, while often sought in the con-
text of commercial relations, is also often considered where the re-
lation between the parties is more personal, for example, where the
parties are husband and wife holding property as tenants by the en-
tireties. In these more personal cases the basic cause of action
may be for partition or for an accounting, with a receiver sought
to conserve the assets pending resolution of the controversy. Un-
like the corporate or partnership situation where the parties may
have an agreed-upon method of settling their differences incorpo-
rated into their relationship, the parties here must rely on the
strength of their relationship to solve the problem. When the
parties fail to resolve their differences, one or the other may seize
the property and exclude the other from access to it.
Such a situation was presented in Shapiro v. Shapiro,20 3 where
the dispute concerned the respective rights of a husband and wife
in their collective property, both real and personal. The lower
court had ordered the husband to turn over certain properties to
the wife, and a receiver was appointed who was ordered to account
201. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n v. Evans, 13 Pa. D. &
C.2d 290, 292 (Dauph. 1957), aff'd, 392 Pa. 110, 139 A.2d 530 (1958).
202. Beaumont v. Beaumont, 166 Pa. 615, 616, 31 A. 336 (1895).
203. 424 Pa. 120, 224 A.2d 164 (1966).
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for rentals, dividends and other receipts due the wife from the
properties, to inventory the personalty claimed by the wife and to
take possession of all: of the property held as tenants by the
entireties. 20 4 On appeal, the lower court's decision was affirmed,
and the "power of the court to appoint a receiver under the extra-
ordinary circumstances" was said to be "clear. '205 The court stated
that under the "aggravated circumstances herein portrayed, the ap-
pointment of a receiver was not an abuse of discretion. '20 6
The power was said to be "clear" based on the need to account
for and preserve property as a part of a partition action.20 7 This
decision in Shapiro was specifically based upon the reasoning
in Lindenfelser v. Lindenfelser,20 in which a separated husband
and wife came into conflict over three properties in which they had
an entireties interest, and the wife sought an accounting, partition,
and a receiver. The court set forth what it termed to be the "mod-
ern rule" in holding that the failure of the lower court to appoint
a receiver was an abuse of discretion under circumstances where a:
[h] usband and wife are separated but not divorced
and where one of them is excluded from the exercise or
enjoyment of rights inherent in an estate held by the en-
tireties .... 209
In such a case, where one is excluded, the Lindenfelser court
held that an accounting of the property might be made and the
the proceeds divided between them. The court's reasoning was
based on its interpretation of the Married Woman's Property Act
210
as authorizing, where an exclusion occurs, a suit for partition of
the property grounded on the exclusion working as an implied offer
to dissolve the tenancy by the entirety and divide it between the
holders.211 The decision was also grounded in the proposition that
neither spouse may appropriate entireties property to his or her
own exclusive use,2 12 and recognizes the need for the extraordinary
204. Id. at 125, 224 A.2d at 168.
205. Id. at 125 n.6, 224 A.2d at 173 n.6.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 125, 224 A.2d at 173-74.
208. 396 Pa. 530, 153 A.2d 901 (1959).
209. Id. at 534-35, 153 A.2d at 904.
210. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 111 (1965).
211. Lindenfelser v. Lindenfelser, 396 Pa. 530, 534, 153 A.2d 901, 904
(1959). See Shapiro v. Shapiro, 424 Pa. 120, 224 A.2d 164 (1966); Berhalter
v. Berhalter, 315 Pa. 225, 228, 173 A. 172, 173 (1954). See also DeLuca
v. DeLuca, 388 Pa. 167, 130 A.2d 179 (1957).
212. Lindenfelser v. Lindenfelser, 396 Pa. 530, 534, 153 A.2d 901, 904
(1959). See Williamson v. Williamson, 57 Pa. D. & C.2d 413 (Lehigh
1971).
remedy in a difficult situation with seemingly no alternate solu-
tion. The Lindenfelser court felt that
[n] othing can be made to move without a receiver when
the parties are at sword's point and one of them cannot
get into the properties or have a word about their rental
and expense. It is regretable to incur the expense of a
receiver, but the parties have created an impasse that re-
quires one and there is no other way to remove the ob-
stacle to a final solution.
213
The view as set forth in the Lindenfelser case is not unique to
Pennsylvania, and support for this kind of appointment may be
found in other jurisdictions. In a Maryland case which discussed
Lindenfelser with approval, Colburn v. Colburn, 14 it was held
that it is clear that a court of equity may appoint a receiver of
properties held by the entireties, and that
[u] nlike the Pennsylvania court, infra, we think it entirely
possible that the facts and circumstances in some future
case might be so unusual that it would be inequitable to
deny the wife an accounting and the appointment of a rc-
ceiver, even though she and her husband were not sepa-
rated and living apart.
215
In a situation in which the holders were not tenants by the
entireties, a New Jersey court applied the same reasoning where
tenants in common were concerned, in Smith v. Smith.210 This
case arose when a suit was brought by a tenant in common
for partition, and the appointment of a receiver was sought to
preserve the rents and profits of the lands pendente lite. Although
the appointment was denied for lack of necessity, the court stated
that a receiver would ordinarily be appointed in a partition suit
where the tenant in possession was committing waste causing irep-
arable injury, where there had been a wrongful exclusion, where
the tenant in possession took the rents and profits and refused to
account for them, or in "other circumstances in which the miscon-
duct of the tenant in possession occasions a justifiable apprehen-
sion of imminent and irreparable injury to the clear rights of the
co-tenant.
217
In Sellers v. Hanratty,218 where the plaintiff was a participant
in what was basically a joint enterprise, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court approved a somewhat similar view by virtue of its' statement
that:
[w] hile the bill in equity first filed sought to dissolve
an alleged partnership, it was amended so as to aver a
213. Lindenfelser v. Lindenfelser, 396 Pa. 530, 533, 153 A.2d 901, 904
(1959) (emphasis supplied).
214. 262 Md. 333, 278 A.2d 1 (1971).
215. Id. at 338, 278 A.2d at 4.
216. 137 N.J. Eq. 463, 48 A.2d 786 (1946).
217. Id. at 464, 48 A.2d at 787 (dicta).




tenancy in common, a joint association or a partnership.
Equity has jurisdiction in partition, and even if the rela-
tion be that of tenants in common equity will work out
their rights.
219
It should be noted that these cases are also based on a clear
right of the plaintiff in the property and require that the equitable
nature of the action be established.2 20 For example, a plaintiff
who does not have a clear right, such as a plaintiff in an ejectment
suit claiming as a beneficiary of property by virtue of a will, or by
intestate descent, may not maintain an action against one in pos-
session because he has an adequate remedy at law.221 The plain-
tiff must show some equity in the situation, and cannot prevail in a
prayer for appointment on a mere legal title.222
In another more personal relationship, beneficiaries of a trust
may have the proper equitable basis, and cases may be found in
which beneficiaries have applied to the court for the appointment
of a receiver where trust properties require some form of conserva-
tion or protection.22 For instance, in Darlington v. Reilly224 a peti-
tion for the appointment of a substitute trustee was heard in con-
junction with an application for the appointment of a receiver. A
receiver was appointed pendente lite of the question of a contract
of the deceased trustee, to preserve the status quo of the trust pend-
ing the final determination of rights of the various parties.
In addition to the tenancy by the entireties situation involving
husband and wife, the Pennsylvania law of receivers also includes
another situation in which a receiver has been appointed where
a husband and wife are the parties. This has occurred where a hus-
band deserts his wife, leaving her helpless to deal with the prop-
erty left behind, due to his interest in it. This area has a statutory
reference, 225 and the equitable basis and necessity in this situation
stems from the need for the continued maintenance and support of
the wife.
219. Sellers v. Hanratty, 343 Pa. 316, 319, 22 A.2d 697, 698 (1944).
220. See notes 74-117 (The Terms as Guideposts), 118-155 (The Rela-
tionship of an Equitable Cause of Action).
221. See, e.g., Schlect's Appeal, 60 Pa. 172, 176 (1869). See 1 Clark
53.
222. Schlect's Appeal, 60 Pa. 172, 175 (1869). See also Langenderfer
v. Dangler, 65 Ohio App. 528, 31 N.E.2d 175 (1940).
223. See Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 23 F. Supp. 763, 771
(E.D. Pa. 1939).
224. Darlington v. Reilly, 358 Pa. 380, 57 A.2d 861 (1948). See also
Tepper v. Talcott, 11 N.J. Super. 246, 78 A.2d 275 (1951) (appointment
in conjunction with a trust).
225. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, §§ 131-132 (1965).
In DiFrancesco v. DiFrancesco22 for example, the plaintiff's
husband deserted her and failed to provide suitable maintenance,
having left his property in the hands of the defendant, under a
lease. The court held that the plaintiff's wife was entitled to ap-
propriate equitable decrees against the real property of the hus-
band, by virtue of statutory authority, 227 and appointed a receiver
to seize the property and take possession, to receive the rents and
profits, to apply the same to taxes, maintenance and liens and en-
cumbrances, and to pay the balance to her in the amount necessary
for her maintenance and support.
228
In a similar situation, considered in Flynn v. Flynn,229 the
rents and profits of the husband's dwelling houses were seized,
and the appointment of a receiver made. In Kemnitzer v. Kemnit-
zer,230 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld an appointment
where neglect to support and desertion were charged, and the hus-
band's interest in the estate of his deceased father was subjected to
the wife and children's needs, the court holding that:
[t] here was legal warrant for the appointment of a receiver
to take over and conserve the husband's interest in his
deceased father's estate, for the benefit of his children.
23 1
The seizure of a husband's property where there is desertion
and a failure to maintain support of children is, again, not unique
in Pennsylvania, and in some jurisdictions, where alimony is im-
posed, the sequestration of a husband's property, with the aid of a
receiver, may be a part of the proceedings in divorce.
23 2
It may thus be said that in the area of relations not necessarily
devoted to commercial enterprise, and particularly in the case of
husband and wife, receivership may be considered favorably, pro-
vided the normal equitable prerequisites are met.
D. Parties: Debtors/Creditors
In many instances the prayer for equitable relief, coupled with
a request for a receiver in aid of that relief, will be brought not by
one who is involved in the ownership or control of the property
involved, but by one who looks to the property as security for a
debt. In such a case the appointment of a receiver will be consid-
ered utilizing the same principles that are applicable to the parties
226. 8 Ches. Co. Rep. 154 (Pa. C.P. 1957).
227. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, §§ 131-132 (1965).
228. DiFransesco v. DiFransesco, 8 Ches. Co. Rep. 154, 159 (Pa. C.P.
1957).
229. 3 Pa. D. & C. 595 (York 1923).
230. 335 Pa. 105, 6 A.2d 571 (1939).
231. Id. at 112, 6 A.2d at 574.
232. See Smith v. Smith, 9 N.Y.S.2d 188, 255 App. Div. 652 (1939);
Lowenthal v. Lowenthal, 243 N.Y.S. 21, 229 App. Div. 446 (1930); DeLukac-
seuics v. Nagle, 89 N.J. Eq. 106, 103 A. 375 (1918); 27A C.J.S. § 103 Di-
vorce; 27B C.J.S. § 270 Divorce (1959).
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considered in the preceding sections. However, this area seems to
be more complex and to be still more difficult to bring into sharp
focus.
One element of some consistency in this area may be found
in the courts' treatment of debtor-creditor suits in terms of the
status of the debtor and the creditor. Review of the cases reveals
that the courts invariably discuss: (1) whether the creditor is se-
cured or unsecured; 233 (2) whether the debtor is solvent or insol-
vent;2 34 and (3) whether the debtor is an individual or a corpora-
tion (or partnership).235
A fairly common fact situation 236 arises when C-Creditor be-
comes concerned about D-debtor's management of his affairs. It ap-
pears that D is overextended, is wasting his assets, may be de-
frauding his creditors, is keeping no records of his transactions or
his tangled finances, and appears to be on the brink of financial dis-
aster, as his various creditors are threatening to subject his proper-
ties to their claims. C feels that if D could stabilize his finances
for a short time, all his debts could be paid and D's assets would
not be sold at far below their value at a forced sale. To accomplish
this, C tries to get a receiver appointed.
In order to do so, C must look at all the factors involved, includ-
ing his own status, and that of D, in deciding if his action is war-
ranted. If C's only purpose in seeking an appointment is to delay
the other creditors, then the appointment will not be made.
237 C
must also consider the nature of his claim. Where he is a simple
contractor creditor, the general rule in equity is that he cannot
prevail until he has exhausted his remedy in law, because he has a
remedy at law on the debt.238 It is often said that the reason that
233. See, e.g., Hodgsett v. Thompson, 258 Pa. 85, 101 A. 941 (1917).
234. See, e.g., McDougall v. Huntingdon & Broad Top R. & C. Co., 294
Pa. 108, 143 A. 574 (1928).
235. See, e.g., Hodgsett v. Thompson, 258 Pa. 85, 101 A. 941 (1917).
236. The hypothetical factual situation generally follows the facts
found in Hodgsett, with some additions.
237. See Blum Bros. v. Girard Nat'l Bank, 248 Pa. 148, 155, 93 A. 940,
943 (1915), and cases cited therein. The appointment of a receiver may
halt suits against D, as the receiver may not, as the court's representative,
be sued without its consent. See Irving Trust Co. v. Spruce Apartments,
44 F.2d 218, 221 (E.D. Pa. 1930); Warner v. Conn, 347 Pa. 617, 620, 32
A.2d 740, 741 (1943). The appointment of a receiver does not effect exist-
ing hens, however. (See discussion in Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n v.
Evans, 13 Pa. D. & C.2d 290, 292 (Dauph. 1957), affd, 392 Pa. 110, 139
A.2d 530 (1958).
238. Pittsburgh Equitable Meter Co. v. Paul C. Loeber & Co., 160 F.2d
721, 729 (7th Cir. 1947); Ivey v. Housing Foundation of America, Inc., 73
F. Supp. 201, 202 (M.D. Pa. 1947); Lacocca v. Robbins, 60 Pa. D. & C.
he must reduce his claim to judgment is that until he does, he has
no right in the property, a prerequisite to the appointment of a
receiver. 23 9 Where C has reduced his claim to judgment and ex-
huasted his remedies at law and the requisite equitable grounds
otherwise exist, then he may be in a position to have a receiver
appointed.
240
Because the Pennsylvania courts tend to treat partnerships and
corporations similarly in this area,241 it is possible to consider them
together. In the preceding paragraph it was said that a receiver
will not be appointed where C is a simple contract creditor. When
C's debtor is a corporation (or partnership), an immediate excep-
tion to that rule arises under certain circumstances. One of those is
where C an get a corporation to consent to an appointment. Such
appointments have been made in the federal courts, usually in the,
case of a public service corporation.2 42 The Pennsylvania courts
seem willing to consider such consent appointments also, as it was
said in Globe Solvents, Inc. v. Nouskhajian, Trustee243 that where
the court has jurisdiction to appoint a receiver, the appointment
may proceed on the consent of the interested parties.244 More-
over, the Business Corporation Law has a specific provision wherein
a corporation can ask the court for the appointment of a receiver,
as part of a voluntary dissolution.
245
It will also make some difference to C whether the corpora-
tion is solvent or not. Where the corporation is insolvent, the In-
solvency Act 24 6 provisions provide statutory remedies, to include
the appointment of a receiver, and these may be utilized.247 Ad-
ditionally, the Business Corporation Law's provisions involving
dissolution may be brought into play, providing for a liquidating
receiver.248  It may, however, not be to C's advantage to try to
force dissolution or aver insolvency, particularly if his priority is
low and he is dependent on the continuation of a venture in order
to get his return. If C does choose to assert insolvency, the defini-
tion of insolvency in the statute may be disadvantageous if D is
300 (Lehigh 1947); Comment, Equitable Remedy of Receivership: State
Law in the Federal Courts, 10 STAN. L. REv. 361, 362 (1958).
239. Pussey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U.S. 491, 497 (1923); Thomp-
son's Receivership, 25 Pa. Dist. 757, 763 (Fayette 1916).
240. Pittsburgh Equitable Meter Co. v. Paul C. Loeber & Co., 160 F.2d
721, 728 (7th Cir. 1947); Ivey v. Housing Foundation of America, Inc., 73
F. Supp. 201, 202 (M.D. Pa. 1947).
241. See notes 31, 186 and accompanying text supra.
242. Ivey v. Housing Foundation of America, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 201, 103
(M.D. Pa. 1947).
243. 148 Pa. Super. 202, 24 A.2d 687 (1942).
244. Id. at 207, 24 A.2d at 690.
245. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2104(D) (1967).
246. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 1-326 (1967).
247. Tate v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 410 Pa. 490, 499, 190 A.2d 316,
321 (1963).
248. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2108 (1967).
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heavily encumbered but not sufficiently so to be proven insol-
vent,2 49 or if the assets consist of undeveloped resources that must
be developed to yield full return. The McDougall court 25 0 com-
mented on such a situation, recognizing that:
a company and individuals, when income is insufficient to
meet demand, may have abundant assets, but be unable
to realize on them quickly. . . [a] receiver is often neces-
sary to prevent despoliation by forced sale as well as to
conserve and preserve them from loss or dissipation
through mismanagement, fraud, or unlawful acts .... 251
In other words, C may wish that a receiver carry on the business
rather than liquidate it. In either event, it is clear that where there
is insolvency coupled with other equitable grounds, a receiver may
be appointed for a corporation, where C is a judgment creditor.25 2
Additionally, where the corporation is solvent, and the assets
are threatened with waste, or there is fraud, gross mismanage-
ment, or any other of the previously discussed prerequisites ap-
pear, and C's interest is threatened, the fact that D is solvent will
not serve to bar C's action for appointment.255
If D is an individual, it appears at first glance that C may have
a difficult time getting a receiver appointed, and in most circum-
stances where D is solvent, will not be able to. Where D is insol-
vent, C may be able to reach D under the Insolvency Act, which spe-
cifically includes "person or persons" within its' reach.254
Where the individual is solvent, however, the Pennsylvania
courts will not generally appoint a receiver, based on the decision
249. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 32 (1959), which provides that the
aggregate of D's property must be, at fair value, insufficient to pay his
debts.
250. McDougall v. Huntingdon & Broad Top R. & C. Co., 294 Pa. 108,
143 A. 574 (1928).
251. Id. at 122, 143 A. at 580.
252. See McDougall v. Huntingdon & Broad Top R. & C. Co., 294 Pa.
108, 121-22, 143 A. 574, 579 (1928), for discussion on insolvency as grounds
for appointment, generally.
253. McDougall v. Huntingdon & Broad Top R. & C. Co., 294 Pa. 108,
117, 143 A. 574, 478 (1928); see Tate v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 410 Pa.
490, 190 A.2d 316, 321 (1963). In Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n v. Evans,
13 Pa. D. & C.2d 290 (Dauph. 1957), aff'd, 392 Pa. 110, 139 A.2d 530 (1958),
the Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n sought an injunction and the appoint-
ment of a receiver to conserve monies that they claimed were obtained
fraudulently. The defendant corporation was solvent at the time of the
suit and an injunction and the appointment of a receiver was approved.
The order was modified on appeal to include the injunction only because
there was no administratable property. However, the court indicated that
the appointment would have been approved had there been such property.
254. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 31 (1954).
in Hodgsett v. Thompson.255 In Hodgsett, a bill was filed by an un-
secured creditor, averring that the defendant had assets in the form
of vast coal lands, that he was unable to meet the various com-
mitments due on the encumbrances thereon as they became due,
and that executions had been threatened which would wipe out the
assets if completed because a depressed price would be obtained.
The bill alleged that if a receiver were appointed, a sale could be
made which would bring in sufficient funds to pay all the creditors,
both secured and unsecured. The court traced the history of equi-
table receivers in Pennsylvania and concluded that there was no
express authority for the appointment of a receiver for a solvent
individual. The court characterized the action before them as an
attempt to delay creditors, and distinguished the request from one
in which a receivership was asked for in aid of execution.
The decision in the lower court, reported in Thompson's Re-
ceivership,258 had also dealt with the historical basis for receivers,
and had concluded that Section V of the Act of 1836,257 which pro-
vides for the powers and jurisdiction of courts of chancery with re-
gard to the "prevention or restraint of the commission or continu-
ance of acts contrary in law and prejudicial to the interest of the
community or the rights of individuals" gave it the power to ap-
point a receiver where an individual was concerned. The lower
court reasoned that the "equitable jurisdiction to restrain acts con-
trary to law under the statute includes acts contrary to equity,
inasmuch as equity, in a general sense, is part of the law. '2 8  The
Hodgsett court disagreed, however, stating that the probable acts
of the creditors were in no way contrary to law, and that the Act
of 1836 did not give the courts jurisdiction with regard to individ-
uals.
25 9
The earlier case of Galey v. Guffey 260 in which a receiver
had been appointed for an individual on similar facts was also
considered. Subsequent to the appointment in Galey, a secured
creditor had asked for leave of the court to proceed on his mortgage,
on the grounds that he had the right to do so under its provisions.
On appeal, leave was granted. The Hodgsett court pointed out that
in allowing the appeal, it did not consider the question of a re-
ceiver for the individual specifically, and thus that Galey did not
constitute authority to allow an appointment for a solvent individ-
ual.2
6 1
It is also noteworthy that the appointment in Thompson's Re-
255. 258 Pa. 85, 101 A. 941 (1917); accord Globe Solvents v. Nouskhaj-
ian, 148 Pa. Super. 202, 24 A.2d 687 (1942).
256. 25 Dist. 757 (Fayette 1916).
257. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
258. Thompson's Receivership, 25 Dist. 757, 761 (Fayette 1916).
259. Hodgsett v. Thompson, 258 Pa. 85, 92, 101 A. 941, 943 (1917).
260. 248 Pa. 253, 94 A. 238 (1915).
261. Hodgsett v. Thompson, 258 Pa. 85, 95-96, 101 A. 941, 944 (1917).
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ceivership was based on consent. Clark has specifically pointed out
that the Pennsylvania courts will not allow an appointment for an
individual, even where he consents. 26 2 In commenting on the rule,
Clark states that in his opinion the reasons usually given by the
courts for confining consent appointments on behalf of simple con-
tract creditors to corporations are "not sound. '268 Clark feels that
the involved affairs of individuals can be just as complex as those
of corporations, and he predicts that consent appointments will
eventually be extended to cover cases in which simple contract
creditors are involved and a solvent individual consents.
264
Appointment for an individual was considered in Ivey v. Hous-
ing Foundation of America, Inc.,2 6 5 where the court noted that var-
ious decisions in the federal courts have denied appointment
for an individual, and that in these cases the matter was decided on
grounds that the "administration of the affairs of a solvent individ-
ual is not a recognized head of equity jurisdiction. '266 The court in
Ivey recognized the "very interesting discussion on the possibilities
of such a receivership being granted if the proper fact situation was
presented to the court"267 as presented by Clark, but held that al-
though a corporation's consent would "remove the only obstacle to
the relief desired, '26 8 the established rule that no appointment will
be made for an individual could not be waived because the "subject
matter [was] not within the province of the court."269 The court
in both Hodgsett and Ivey, however, distinguish the situation in
which C is a simple contract creditor and D is an individual from
the situation in which C is a judgment creditor. Additionally,
Hodgsett points out that where an individual is insolvent, there are
statutory remedies available. 270 This process of elimination of
areas in which a receiver will not be appointed for an individual
narrows the scope of the decision in Hodgsett. However, this fact
does not plainly appear when considering statements made by
courts which tend to generalize the rule. For example, in Globe
Solvents, Inc. v. Nouskhajian,271 the court said: "It is true that a
262. 1 Clark 292.
263. Id. at 293.
264. Id.
265. 73 F. Supp. 201 (M.D. Pa. 1947).




270. Id. at 206; See Hodgsett v. Thompson, 258 Pa. 85, 96, 101 A. 941,
944 (1917).
271. 148 Pa. Super. 202, 24 A.2d 687 (1942).
receiver cannot be appointed for an individual who is sui juris, or
for his property .... ,,272 adding no further explanation.
Beginning with the proposition that there is no jurisdiction
in equity to appoint a receiver when D is an individual, one may
add the exception that where D is insolvent an appointment may
be made,2 73 and, may also add that where C is secured, having ex-
hausted his remedy at law, he may get an appointment. 27 4 The ad-
ditions to the general statement leave remaining a narrow rule:
where D is an individual, is solvent, and C is a simple contract
creditor, no appointment will be made, even if D consents. The
key here is the status of the parties.
27 5
As D's affairs as a solvent individual may be as complex as
those of D as a corporation, there seems to be no other reason for
refusing to appoint for the individual who consents beyond the
Hodgsett court's interpretation of Article V of the Act of 1836 as
denying jurisdiction. It may be that in the proper fact situation a
consent appointment for an individual might be approved if the ar-
gument in Thompson's Receivership was successfully advocated.
Because this fact situation is narrowly drawn, it may be that
the question will not arise again in Pennsylvania. On the other
hand, given the hypothetical situation posed at the beginning of
this section regarding D and C, and the fact that consent appoint-
ments are seemingly allowed for corporations, it is not inconceiv-
able that a creditor may urge appointment for a solvent individual,
and it would not appear to be a futile gesture. In any event, it is
submitted that the flat statement that receivers will not be ap-
pointed for individuals is not totally accurate in most situations,
and in a situation in which the equities are strong the fact that D
is an individual should not completely foreclose consideration of
the appointment of a receiver.
Although the parties involved in a given factual situation may
not be ultimately determinative of the outcome of a request for a
receiver, the preceding is indicative of the importance that courts
have placed on this factor, and it is submitted that the parties
should be a consideration in an analysis of the potential for favor-
able consideration of a given request.
III. CONCLUSION
The Pennsylvania courts do not posses general chancery pow-
272. Id. at 208, 24 A. at 690.
273. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 31 (1954).
274. Ivey v. Housing Foundation of America, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 201, 206
(M.D. Pa. 1947).
275. In the husband and wife cases, notes 203-32 supra, the person for
whom a receiver is appointed is clearly an individual, and is presumably
solvent, yet no mention is made in these cases of the inherent limitations
of jurisdiction. The significant factor is thus the question of whether the
petitioner has a right in the property of the defendant, which can be deter-
mined through analysis of the relation of the parties.
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ers, but have only such jurisdiction as has been conferred by stat-
ute, the basic authorization for equitable powers being the Act of
1836, which makes no provision specifically for the appointment
of receivers. As a result of this historical background, the law of
receivers in Pennsylvania has developed on equitable principles,
and has been developed in the traditional situations in which re-
ceivers were appointed in chancery courts. In some instances, the
legislature has provided specific statutory guidelines as to the ap-
pointment of receivers where historical grounds such as waste, in-
solvency, fraud or danger to property are involved.
No general rules can be stated regarding what circumstances
will prompt the appointment of a receiver, but it is helpful in at-
tempting to determine if the situation is appropriate for this kind of
relief to look at the guideposts provided by the terms the courts
use, the kinds of equitable claims with which receivers are often
appointed, and the nature of the relationships of the parties in-
volved. Although this framework for analysis will not necessarily
yield a clear-cut answer in every case, it can be helpful in determin-
ing the possibility of success of a given petition for a receiver.
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